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Abstract
We outline a detection method for adversarial inputs to deep neural networks. By viewing
neural network computations as graphs upon which information flows from input space to out-
put distribution, we compare the differences in graphs induced by different inputs. Specifically,
by applying persistent homology to these induced graphs, we observe that the structure of the
most persistent subgraphs which generate the first homology group differ between adversarial
and unperturbed inputs. Based on this observation, we build a detection algorithm that de-
pends only on the topological information extracted during training. We test our algorithm
on MNIST and achieve 98% detection adversary accuracy with F1-score 0.98.
1 Introduction
Artificial neural networks (neural networks) are a class of machine learning algorithms that learn
to accomplish tasks by considering example data and iteratively reconfiguring themselves. This
ability to learn input representations without task-specific programming has proven to be extremely
powerful in solving machine learning problems across a multitude of domains. For example, neural
networks have been used successfully in image and speech recognition [26, 14, 8, 28, 20, 12] as well
as in the reconstruction of brain circuits [10], analysis of particle accelerator data [6], prediction of
gene mutation [16], and language translation [25] among many other applications.
Much research has been done to better understand these neural network computations. For
example, Li et al. [18] look at bipartite matching of neuron activations to determine whether
different neural networks learn the same representations as encoded by these neural activations.
They determine that neural network architectures trained on the same data generally do encode
similar representations. As well, tools for visualizations of hidden neural network layers have shown,
in a qualitative sense, how neural networks might build up these complex representations of their
input [29, 30]. These layer-wise visualizations imply that neural networks build representations
from simple, Gabor-like features in early layers into more complex features like faces, circles, or
flower petals in later layers. These results seem to imply that neural networks are able to robustly
capture the relevant semantic information within their input in an intuitive manner.
However, Szegedy et al. [27] showed that by adding human-imperceptible noise to an input
example, neural networks can be fooled into misclassifying this now adversarial example that it
originally correctly classified, despite very little change in the input. These adversarial examples
have been shown to exist in numerous domains across many network architectures [21].
Much recent work has focused on correctly classifying these adversarial examples [13, 9, 2].
Unfortunately, these methods tend to perform poorly as adversarial examples are deeply linked
to the nonlinear computations and deformations of input space that provide much of the power
derived from neural networks. Noting this, researchers have turned towards the detection of ad-
versarial examples outright [3, 19, 17]. Carlini et al. [4], in an excellent review, show that these
detection methods are also not particularly robust, especially in scenarios where the adversary has
information on the detection algorithm.
The existence of adversarial examples in neural networks reveals that the internal represen-
tations neural networks use to make classification decisions may not be as robust as intuition
expects. The ubiquity of adversarial examples across neural network architectures and between
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problem domains points to the understanding that adversarial examples exploit the brittle, nonlin-
ear representation structure that neural networks employ in classification. Given this, it is natural
to ask whether this exploitation is detectable within the structure of the computation itself.
Motivated by this question, we construct a framework for quantifying, in a global sense, neural
network computations for a given input. By viewing neural network computations as graphs, we
can formally trace the flow of information from the input layer to the output layer. We look at
the persistent homology of the graphs induced by different inputs and view the difference in their
persistent subgraphs. This formalization allows us to quantify how different any two classification
decisions are in terms of connected components and flow of information through the input-induced
computational graph. With this construction, we investigate how adversarial examples are reflected
in changes in the induced computational graph.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formally introduces neural network compu-
tations and explains how they may be viewed as weighted, directed graphs. Section 3 introduces
persistent homology and how it relates to graphs of neural network computations. Section 4 de-
scribes the adversaries studied in the paper. Section 5 summarizes the results of the paper and
gives recommendations of future work. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Neural Networks as Graphs
The results of this paper rely on the ability to represent neural networks as computational graphs.
In general, we look to model information flow through a neural network from input to probability
distribution. This idea is well-founded given the close relationship of convolutional, recurrent,
and fully-forward neural networks to deep belief and Bayesian networks. This section outlines
the graphical construction for convolutional and fully-connected layers because we use only these
layers in the tests later in the paper. However, other types of neural network layers, like pooling
or recurrent layers, can be realized under the same paradigm.
There exist multiple ways to view neural networks as directed graphs of information flow. The
first is a static representation in which the network’s filters and weight matrices define the potential
for information flow through the network. The second is the realized information flow through the
network after an input is added. This paper focuses on this second representation, as we are
interested in differences in information flow across different inputs.
2.1 Fully-Connected Layers
Fully-connected layers are structured such that every neuron in the output of the previous layer is
connected to each neuron in the next layer. This computational structure is typically implemented
as matrix multiplication where the left matrix has elements consisting of each neuron’s activation
value in the previous layer’s output, and the right matrix contains the weighted connections between
the previous layer’s output and the next layer’s output neurons.
The graphical representation of a fully-connected layer then naturally simplifies to a fully-
connected graph with weights described by the resultant multiplicative values of the weight matrix
being multiplied by the previous layer’s activations. These multiplicative values are induced when
an input is fed into the network and the activations propagate to the layer’s weight matrix. The
vertices of a fully-connected layer’s graphical representation are the previous layer’s output neurons
along with the next layer’s output neurons. At the output activation propagation to the next layer,
the neurons perform an addition operation on all of the input edges (weights) to determine the
input to its activation function then passes equally the resulting value as its activation value.
2.2 Convolutional Layers
Convolutional layers are characterized by performing a convolution operation of output activations
from the previous layer with a filter matrix. Again, one can view this layer’s operation in terms
of matrix multiplication. Namely, we move the filter in a predetermined stride across the matrix
formed by the output activations of the previous layer and compute a matrix multiplication op-
eration at each stride step. The output of this operation determines the activation values of the
output neurons.
The graphical view of this operation can be realized in a similar manner to the fully-connected
case. The connections between the output neurons of the previous layer to the output neurons
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Figure 1: A convolution matrix multiplication operation (left) and its graphical representation
(right).
of the next layer are determined largely by the size of the filter, the stride, and the filter values.
We can visualize these edge connections by viewing the pre-image of the filter matrix at each
stride on the previous layer’s output neurons such that each neuron in the pre-image connects to
a single neuron in the next output layer with edge weight equal to the activation value of that
neuron multiplied by the filter value at that location in the image. The vertices of this graph are
the output neurons from the previous layer and the output neurons of the next layer. An output
neuron of this layer performs an addition operation on all of its input edge weights to determine
its input to its activation function then passes equally the resulting value as its activation value.
3 Persistent Homology
With a proper representation of our neural network as a directed graph, we can now view dif-
ferences in the graphs induced by different inputs. One way to measure these differences is via
persistent homology. Persistent homology is a tool from topological data analysis that allows one
to summarize the global topological information of a discretely approximated space. Persistent
homology counts the number of “holes" in different dimensions of a space at different thresholds
of connectedness within the underlying points. More persistent features (holes) that survive over
a larger variation of threshold values are more likely to represent actual features of the space and
are less likely to be produced by noise. There exist numerous open-source libraries that include
functionality for computing persistent homology [22, 23, 11]. Persistent homology is defined on
simplicial complexes, of which weighted graphs are an example.
More formally, consider a real-valued function on a simplicial complex f : K → R that is non-
decreasing on increasing sequences of faces f(σ) < f(τ) when σ is a face of τ inK. For all q ∈ R the
sublevel setK(q) = f−1(−∞, q] is a subcomplex ofK. The ordering of the values of f onK induces
an ordering on the sublevel complexes. We then have a filtration ∅ = K0 ⊆ K1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Kn = K.
When i ≤ j ≤ n the inclusion Ki ↪−→ Kj induces a homomorphism f i,jp : Hp(Ki)→ Hp(Kj) on the
pth simplicial homology group where p is the dimension. The pth persistent homology groups are
the images of these homomorphisms and the pth persistent Betti numbers βi,jp are the associated
ranks of these groups. A persistence module over a partially ordered set V is a set of vector spaces
Ut indexed by V with associated linear maps ust : Us → Ut when s ≤ t. We can consider this
function a functor from V considered as a category to the category of vector spaces. We then have
a classification of persistence modules over a field F indexed by N:
U ' ⊕ixti · F [x]⊕ (⊕jxrj · (F [x]/(xsj · F [x])))
Multiplication by x moves up one step in the persistence module. The free parts of the right
side of the equation correspond to the homology generators that appear (are born) at filtration
level ti and do not disappear. The torsion elements correspond to homology generators that are
born at rj and disappear (die) at sj in the filtration. Using this information, we may uniquely
represent the persistent homology of a simplicial complex as a persistence diagram which plots a
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point for each generator with its x-coordinate corresponding to its birth time and its y-coordinate
the death time.
Given two persistence diagrams X and D, we can define the Wasserstein distance between
them:
Wp(X,D) = inf
φ:X→D
(∑
x∈X
‖x− φ(x)‖q
) 1
p
(1)
where p ≥ 1, q ≤ ∞, and φ ranges over bijections between X and D. Letting p → ∞ gives
the bottleneck distance. In this paper, we take p = 2. One can view the Wasserstein distance on
persistence diagrams as a minimal bipartite matching of points between the diagrams where points
are matched by minimum distance in the birth-death plane.
3.1 Persistent Homology on Neural Networks
The Wasserstein distance between persistence diagrams gives us a way to measure topological
similarity between graphs induced by different inputs. For this to work with our characterization
of induced neural network graphs, we need to make a few changes.
First, we take the absolute value of edge weights in our induced neural network graph. The
filtration step of the persistent homology calculation works on a sorted list of simplices by value.
In our framework of information flow, large negative edge weights are as semantically relevant to
the characterization of our network as large positive edge weights because both have a large impact
on the next layer.
Second, we sort simplices in the 0th and 1st dimensions from largest to smallest which is the
reverse of what is typically implemented in persistent homology calculations. This sorting is more
applicable for our usage given that larger edge weights better characterize the global information
flow through the network than smaller edge weights and should thus appear first in the filtration.
Finally, we make a small augmentation to the calculation of the Wasserstein distance between
the persistence diagrams of our input-induced graphs. Components in graphs that persist through
the last filtration value (maximum edge value in our case) are typically assigned a death time of
infinity in the persistence calculation. At each dimension, there will always be at least one point
at infinity. Because our filtration goes from largest edge weight to smallest, components that do
not merge with other simplices and die are given death time equal to the lowest edge weight in the
filtration.
In this paper, we focus on the the zeroth homology group H0, the persistent homology of which
corresponds to the life-death pairs of connected components within a neural network graph induced
by an input. It is possible in a feed-forward architecture like a convolutional neural network to
have non-trivial H1, but the intuition as to what these layer-skipping holes mean in terms of
network semantics is slightly more opaque. As well, because we truncate the death times of non-
dying components, the death times of these H1 holes are all shared which makes computing the
Wasserstein distance more computationally expensive.
3.2 Software
We use the second version of the C++ library Dionysus [22] for the computation of persistent
homology. We use Tensorflow [1] for neural network construction and computations. For ease of
use, we implement the computations found in the Dionysus library as a custom operation within
the Tensorflow library. We also make the changes described in the previous section in this custom
Tensorflow operation1. The analysis in the Results section is performed primarily in Python2.
4 Adversarial Examples
We generate adversarial images for MNIST [15] as described in [5]. As far as the authors know,
this is the strongest method for generating adversarial examples in that the adversaries generated
are able to fool many adversary detection schemes outright and can be augmented to fool others
1This code is available at github.com/tgebhart/dionysus_tensorflow.
2The code used in this analysis can be found at github.com/tgebhart/tf_activation.
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Figure 2: Top: Correctly classified, unaltered MNIST images. Bottom: Adversarial images based
off of the image directly above. Each adversarial image is misclassified as one digit higher modulo
9.
by altering the loss function [4]. We give a brief summary of the adversary generation algorithm
below, but a more in-depth treatment can be found in [5].
4.1 Neural Network Notation
A neural network may be simplified as a function F : Rn → Rm that accepts input x ∈ Rn and
maps this to a class y ∈ Rm. Our input in this paper is a two-dimensional l×w = n pixel grey-scale
image where xi ∈ x is the intensity of pixel i. For MNIST, this corresponds to grey-scale images
of size 28× 28 which we vectorize so that x ∈ R784.
The output of the network is computed using a softmax function which forces each element yi
of y (the logits) to the range 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 such that
m∑
i=1
yi = 1
.
Thus, we can view the output of neural networks as a probability distribution over all classes
yi ∈ y. The predicted class assignment C(x) from the neural network is assigned via C(x) =
argmaxi F (x)i. We define the correct class label as C∗(x) for input example x. Combining this
information, our final output from the neural network can be characterized as
F (x) = softmax(Z(x)) = y
where Z(x) = z are the output logits before softmax.
4.2 Adversarial Examples
We define an adversarial example as an input x′ which is close to another input x according to
some distance metric that, when input into a trained neural network, produces class prediction
C(x′) = t 6= C∗(x). That is, although x and x′ are close in input space, x′ causes the neural
network to misclassify the input. x′ in this scenario is referred to as a targeted adversarial example
with target t.
The distance metric we focus on in this paper is the L2 norm:
‖x′ − x‖2 =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
|xi|2 (2)
which measures the standard Euclidean distance between two vectors. There are other distance
metrics that could be used (L0 or L∞ norms, for instance). Analyzing performance differences in
the detection algorithm described in this paper due to different distance metrics in adversary gen-
eration could be a route for future work, but as will become evident shortly, noticeable performance
differences seem unlikely.
The problem of finding an adversarial image is then characterized as:
minimize ‖x− x+ δ‖2
such that C(x+ δ) = t,
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
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Figure 3: Persistence diagrams induced by similar images are similar. Despite the first two images
being classified by the neural network as different classes, their persistence diagrams appear more
similar than the third image which is classified the same as the first image. Left : The original,
correctly-classified MNIST image and its corresponding persistence diagram. Middle: An adver-
sarial image generated from class 1 that is misclassified as a 7 by the neural network and the
corresponding persistence diagram. Right : An adversarial image generated from class 7 that is
misclassified as a 1 and its corresponding persistence diagram.
In other words, we are looking to find a minimum distortion δ that causes the network to
misclassify the input x as class t. Following [5], we can solve this by choosing w that solves
minimize ‖1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)− x‖22 + cf(
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)
where
f(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i | i 6= t} − Z(x′)t − κ) (3)
The κ parameter allows control of the confidence with which the neural network misclassifies
the adversarial image. The w is optimized using gradient descent with multiple starting point
images to better avoid local minima.
5 Adversary Detection via Persistent Homology
We describe in this section our method of adversary detection using only the topological signature
of neural network computations induced by inputs. To gain intuition on the detection algorithm,
we first provide some observations on the difference between topological signatures induced by
unperturbed images versus adversarial images.
5.1 A Global Network Summary
Persistent homology provides a robust summary of the connected components of a neural network
computation across varying levels of granularity. This summary can be represented as a persistence
diagram (Figure 3). In our usage, each point in the persistence diagram corresponds to a subgraph
within the neural network graph that exists as a a disconnected component between the time
[b, d] where b is the edge threshold value corresponding to the birth time and the death time d
which corresponds to the edge weight threshold at which the component joins a higher-dimensional
component. The component with birth b and death d has lifetime b− d.
With this understanding, it is natural to ask whether the topological structure (and therefore the
persistence diagrams) of neural network computations induced by adversarial examples differs from
those induced by unperturbed inputs. Figure 3 shows there are indeed differences in persistence
diagrams induced by different inputs. In fact, we find that the Wasserstein distance between
persistence diagrams tracks nearly continuously as we interpolate linearly between examples in
input space.
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Unfortunately, persistence diagrams are not unique in their representation of the underlying
network that generates them. Because of this, two different networks induced by two different
inputs can end up having similar persistence diagrams even though the points in each diagram are
generated by completely different subgraphs within the neural network. However, the subgraphs
generating these points are uniquely identified with respect to the neural network itself. Therefore,
two persistence diagrams that have the same points in the (b, d) plane which are generated by
the same subgraphs in the network would be equivalent. Thus, we look to detect adversarial
inputs based on the most robust (“most persistent") subgraphs that exist in the input-induced
networks. In other words, we are looking to detect adversaries by noting which semantic signatures
of the input-induced network do not match the classification made by the neural network. We
look to discriminate substructures within the neural network graph that correspond to adversarial
examples versus unperturbed examples.
This approach aligns with the current understanding of adversarial examples and the represen-
tations built by neural networks. It is generally accepted that convolutional neural networks make
classification decisions by building up increasingly complex object representations across layers
[30]. The semantic information of these representations are represented distributively across many
neurons [18], and it is understood that a neuron may activate in numerous different semantic sce-
narios []. Our adversary detection algorithm relies on these properties of neural networks in that
the topological signature of an input-induced network is constructed from the ensemble of the most
robust substructures (neurons and connections) across all thresholds of activation values. For two
images that are semantically similar (qualitatively or in terms of total distortion), their topological
signatures should be similar if the network is making use of robust semantic representations in its
classification decisions.
In a recent paper, Cubak et al. [7] observe that adversarial examples may be artifacts of
the lack of variance across logit values. The paper investigates adversaries produced by the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), but the same conclusions may be drawn from the adversarial
generation process used in this paper. Namely, these adversary generation algorithms target the
logit values output by the neural network and, subsequently, the network’s inherent uncertainty
in its classification decision. We believe our adversary detection method is robust to adversary
generation algorithms (and their choice of loss), as our algorithm uses information derived from the
computations throughout the entire network, not just the information in the output or pre-softmax
layers. Our detection algorithm is dependent on the substructures used to classify unperturbed
images being noticeably different than those used to classify adversarial images. Therefore, we
expect this algorithm to perform well in networks that have built robust representations for use in
classification decisions but poorly in undertrained or networks that have memorized training data
as this robust semantic information will not be picked up in these cases. Similar reasoning leads
us to expect our detection algorithm to work better as total distortion increases for adversarial
examples.
5.2 Model
We train a simple convolutional neural network on the MNIST handwritten digits dataset. Our
network consists of a single convolutional layer followed by a 25088 × 1024 fully-connected layer
and a 1024× 10 fully-connected layer. The convolutional layer contains 32 5× 5 filters each with
stride 1 and same padding. The weight variables on the fully-connected layers are initialized with
truncated normal with standard deviation 0.1. The bias variables are initialized similarly. During
training, we randomly dropout half the connections according to a uniform normal distribution.
Our model achieves 98.7% accuracy on MNIST after 50 epochs of batch size 128.
5.3 Persistent Homology Calculation
Using notation from Section 4, our trained neural network model F : Rn → Rm takes an input
example x ∈ Rn and maps it to a probability distribution over classes y ∈ Rm. However, as we
saw in Section 2, this network may also be fully represented as a weighted, directed graph. Denote
this graph G = (V,E,w) where V are the vertices (neurons), E the edges (layer-wise connections),
and w : E → R a mapping from edge to edge weight (layer connection to weighted connection).
In other words, the edges are represented by neural connections between layers and their weights
are derived from the connection weights that are described by, for example, the weight matrices in
fully-connected layers or the filters in convolutional layers. For a given architecture, V and E are
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fixed. During training, w changes as the network learns to represent features of the input space.
For the rest of the paper, we assume the neural network has been trained such that w remains
fixed.
For a given input x, feeding this input into the neural network induces a new graph Gx =
(Vx, Ex, f). Gx is a subgraph of G in that its edges and vertices are derived from G such that
Vx ⊆ V and Ex ⊆ E. The function f : Ex → R is a new mapping on the edge weights such
that f = w ◦ g for some relationship between input and edges g : Rn → E that depends on the
network and input. Here, we assume that edges that have zero weight (i.e. f(e) = 0 for e ∈ Ex are
not present in Gx. Thus, depending on the activation functions used, Vx and Ex may be proper
subsets of V and E. For example, ReLU activation would lead to numerous edges in G being sent
to 0 in the induced subgraph Gx.
We can view Gx as a geometric realization of a finite-dimensional simplicial complex K if we
assume an embedding of the graph into Euclidean space. We would like to compute the persistent
homology of this simplicial complex. However, our current input-induced graph can contain edges
with weight less than zero. While this does not impede the persistent homology calculation, it does
affect our intuition of how edge weights correspond to information flow through our input-induced
graph. Namely, edges with large negative weights are passing a large-magnitude suppressant signal
into the next layer. We would like to pick up on this information. As we will see, the persistent
homology calculation requires a filtration on the vertices and edges of its simplicial complex, and
most natural filtrations on a graph with negative and positive edge weights would lose the semantic
importance of large negative edge weights. Therefore, we define a new graph G∗x = (Vx, Ex, φ)
where φ = |f | by taking the absolute value of edge weights in Gx. The absolute value edge weights
lead to an equal semantic interpretation between large positive activation information and large
negative activation information as both are, in theory, more important to classification decisions
made by the network than small negative or positive activation information. We can view G∗x as
a geometric realization of a simplicial complex K∗.
We now look to compute the most persistent features in G∗x by computing the persistent
homology of K∗. We consider the construction of a Rips complex on K∗. For r ∈ R and r > 0,
a Rips complex R(r) is formed by considering the ball of radius r2 centered at vertices in K
∗.
A 1-simplex (edge) is formed between two vertices in K∗ if and only if their balls intersect. A
2-simplex (triangle) is formed among three points if and only if all three balls intersect.
Figure 4: Simple example of net-
work filtration
Let ω = max(φ) be the maximum edge weight in the graph.
We embed Gx in Euclidean space by assuming the pairwise
distance between each node in Vx to be represented by the dif-
ference between ω and its edge weight. In other words, nodes
connected to edges with high weight are closer than nodes
connected by a low-weight edge. We can view this embedding
as a new graph G∗emb = (Vx, Ex, φ
′) with the same vertex and
edge sets but with φ′ = ω−φ. If we consider a finite increasing
sequence 0 = r0 ≤ r1 ≤ r2 · · · ≤ rp, then the Rips filtration F
is a sequence of Rips complexes connected by well-defined in-
clusions R(r0) ↪−→ R(r1) ↪−→ R(r2) ↪−→ . . . ↪−→ R(rp). The inclu-
sions induce homomorphisms between the homology groups of
F such that H∗(R(r0)) → H∗(R(r1)) → H∗(R(r2)) → · · · →
H∗(R(rp)).
We are only interested in H0 and H1 in this scenario as a
feedforward networks only produce–at largest–2-dimensional
objects (diamonds or other polygons) from their edge connec-
tions, leading to trivial Hi for i > 1. H0 tracks 1-dimensional
topological components which correspond to connected com-
ponents within our neural network.
Topological features like connected components or poly-
gons appear and disappear as r increases. The value b = ω−r
at which a component appears is its birth time. The value
d = ω − r at which a topological feature disappears (a con-
nected component merges with another or a polygonal hole is
filled) is known as the component’s death time. We can then
define the lifetime of a component as l = b − d. Again, we take ω − r because we hold the intu-
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ition that components with higher edge weights are more semantically meaningful in classification
decisions made by the neural network than components with lower-weight edges.
Because H2 is trivial, most H1 components of our input-induced network do not get filled into
higher-dimensional simplices and thus have an infinite lifetime. However, we elect to truncate these
lifetimes at the minimum over all edge weights min(φ) as this is technically the end of the filtration
process. This also makes analysis easier as these are endowed with lifetime l = b−min(φ) instead
of l = b− (−∞) as would otherwise be the case.
We found in our analysis that information from H1 is not especially meaningful for adversary
detection. We believe this is due to the fact that almost all H1 components are infinitely lived,
and are thus truncated to d = min(φ). This can be seen in Figure 5. Because there are few
2-dimensional components being integrated with other 2-dimensional components, there is not
much information to be gained on which components are more robust than others. As well, it
is unclear to the authors what the semantic meaning of a persistent 2-dimensional component of
a feedforward neural network would be. Because of this, we focus on 1-dimensional components
(connected components) that are tracked by H0. As a note, if we were to apply this method to
a recurrent architecture, then the H1 homology group would track, at least in part, the recurrent
relationships within the network. This is an interesting area for future work.
Figure 5: Persistence diagram of
H1
The output of the above persistent homology calculation
on Gx is a set D ⊂ R2 of birth-death pairs (b, d) ∈ D which
may be represented as a persistence diagram in the (b, d)
plane. See Figure 4 for a visual representation. Equivalently,
this persistent homology computation is a map3 τ : Gx → D
from subgraphs to points in D. Each of these points is asso-
ciated to a connected component in Gx between edge weight
resolutions b and d. In other words, we can compute an inverse
τ−1 : D → Gx.
Intuitively, the components with the highest lifetime l
should be those most strongly associated to classification de-
cisions, representing substructures within the neural network
that are activated based on prominent features within the in-
put. We hypothesize that differences in these components
should be observable for adversarial inputs when compared to
non-adversarial inputs of the same predicted class.
Take λ to be the threshold on the lifetime of points in the
persistence diagram. We then calculate the set of weighted subgraphs Gλx of Gx that correspond
to each (b, d) ∈ D such that b− d > λ such that Gλx = {Gl | Gl = τ((b, d)), b− d = l > λ}. This
set Gλx is actually a subgraph of Gx. It is this subgraph Gλx = (V λx , Eλx, φ′) that will serve as the
basis for detecting adversarial inputs in neural networks.
5.4 Adversary Detection
We describe in this section three related adversary detection algorithms based on the persistent
subgraphs obtained from input-induced neural network graphs Gx.
To begin, note that most neural networks contain upwards of millions of nodes and edges.
Even with ReLU activations dropping out edges, computing persistent homology on such large
graphs is computationally burdensome. Thus, we introduce parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] which acts as the
layer-wise percentile threshold on edge weights prior to the persistent homology computation. In
other words, we take only the top 100ρ% largest edge weights for each layer. We perform this
calculation layer-wise because average edge weight may be vastly different between layers. In fact,
we see this being the case such that, in general, convolutional layers have higher edge weights than
fully-connected layers. We set ρ = 0.99 for the results described below. One could argue that only
taking the top 1% of weighted edges throws away a lot of information. As we shall see, a lot of the
relevant information is retained in the top 1% of edges which implies many of the induced edge
weights may be noise.
3This map is bijective in practice. Our construction of D leaves room for two pairs (b1, d1) and (b2, d2) such that
b1 = b2 and d1 = d2. In this case, computing persistent homology would give us two points (b, d)1 and (b, d)2 that
are unique even though their birth and death components are equivalent. We can easily map this back to a unique
subgraph in practice.
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We have two parameters, λ and ρ, to control the complexity of the persistent subgraph Gλx
induced by an input. The λ parameter controls the minimum lifetime of the components in
Gλx while ρ controls the weight distribution and number of edges that are used in the persistent
homology calculation.
For our experiments, we construct two sets of adversarial images from the MNIST dataset
using the method described in Section 4 and code provided in [5]. For each set, we sample 50
images from the MNIST dataset and construct 9 targeted adversaries from each for a total of
450 adversarial examples. The first set of 450 adversarial images, A0, are produced with κ = 0,
resulting in average distortion of 1.83. The second set, A20, was produced with κ = 20, leading to
high-confidence predictions in the target class for the adversarial examples and average distortion
3.54. We also sampled 1000 unaltered images from the original dataset. We denote this set of
images as U . Of these images, 550 were used for training and 450 for testing. We denote these
Utrain and Utest, respectively such that Utrain, Utest ⊂ U . We assume we have access to the correct
class labels for Utrain such that we know class(x) for x ∈ Utrain.
5.4.1 Maximum Node Matching
In this detection method, we look to detect discrepancies between the input-induced topological
signature and the expected topological signature of the predicted class. In essence, we are looking
for the semantic substructures within the network that correspond to the true class of the input
despite the fact that the adversary may have added a sufficiently small amount of distortion of the
image to cause the predicted class to change.
To do this, we fix ρ and λ and compute the persistent subgraph Gλx for each x ∈ Utrain. For each
class yi ∈ y, we aggregate all subgraphs computed for each training image with that class label.
Thus, for each yi ∈ y we have a set Gi of subgraphs of Gx where Gi = {Gλx | x ∈ Utrain, class(x) =
i}. Let Vi be the set of vertices of Gi. Remember, Vi ⊂ Vx. We then count the occurrences of
each unique vertex in Vi for each i and rank the now unique vertices according to their appearance
count. Thus, we have a function ri : Vi → Z surjectively taking each v ∈ Vi to its occurrence rank.
Now, for each class i we have a ranked occurrence list for vertices of V that appear in the
induced persistent subgraphs Gλx for each x ∈ Utrain. We hypothesize that these vertex sets are
an indicative aggregate of the most persistent semantic subgraphs of G used for classification in
each class. Thus, images of class i should induce persistent subgraphs that are most similar to the
aggregate vertex set Vi. We define this similarity as the normalized sum in vertex occurrence ranks
between Vi and the induced subgraph vertex set V λx . Therefore, we define our match function as
mi(v) =
{
ri(v) v ∈ Vi
0 otherwise
(4)
For each class i, we then define a similarity score
si(G
λ
x) =
∑
v∈Gλx
mi(v)
|Vi| (5)
We can then find the class of highest similarity via i∗ = argmaxi(si(Gλx)). This i∗ is the class
whose topological signature most resembles the topological signature of the persistent subgraph
induced by x.
Recall our network F takes image x and returns a distribution over classes y. We take the
maximum probability over classes iˆ = argmaxi(y) as our class prediction. Thus, for each input x,
we view the network class prediction iˆ = argmaxi(F (x)).
Our adversary detection scheme is to simply note differences in iˆ versus i∗. Specifically, if
iˆ 6= i∗ we flag the input as a potential adversary. We test this adversary detection scheme on A0
by iterating over A0 and Utest, computing i∗ and iˆ for each image. If iˆ 6= i∗, we mark the image
as an adversary. The results of this process are shown in Table 1.
5.4.2 Average Node Matching
In defining the maximum node matching detection algorithm, we noticed that adversarial inputs
generally have higher similarity scores to all classes than non-adversarial inputs. This section
describes an adversary detection algorithm motivated by this observation.
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We must first compute the expected matching of non-adversarial inputs to be able to compare
this to potential adversarial inputs. We first remove a subset Uval from the training set Utrain that
will serve to calculate the expected similarity across all classes for the training set. To construct
this expected match value, we follow the same matching construction as in Section 5.4.1 except
instead of taking the maximum matching class, we take the mean number of matches over all
classes:
savg(G
λ
x) =
m∑
i=0
si(G
λ
x)
m
(6)
We compute savg for each image in Uval and take the mean and standard deviation across all
observations as
µmval =
∑
x∈Uval
savg(G
λ
x)
|Uval| (7)
σmval =
√√√√ ∑x∈Uval(savg(Gλx)− µval)2
|Uval| − 1 (8)
We use µmval and σ
m
val to predict whether an input is adversarial or not. Specifically, if for a
given input x we find that savg(Gx) > µmval + σ
m
val, we flag it as an adversarial input. The results
of this process are shown in Table 2.
5.4.3 Edge Counting and Average Edge Weight
Figure 6: Top: Distribution
of average edge weight for non-
adversarial images. Bottom: Dis-
tribution of average edge weight
for adversarial images.
Figure 7 shows an interesting property difference between ad-
versarial and non-adversarial examples with respect to the
induced persistent subgraph. It is clear that the persistent
subgraphs induced by adversarial inputs contain many more
edges compared to non-adversarial subgraphs for λ = 0.1.
This property only appears for values near λ = 0.1 for our
model trained on MNIST. For λ < 0.1, the edge distributions
between adversarial and non-adversarial inputs begin to con-
verge. For λ > 0.1, the edge count for non-adversarial inputs
drops to zero. This fact implies there is an underlying differ-
ence in distribution of subgraph component lifetimes between
adversarial and non-adversarial images. In particular, adver-
sarial images induces more, longer-lived subgraphs than their
non-adversarial counterparts. Perhaps this is an artifact of the
optimization process used to generate the adversarial images
wherein the optimization targets more robust (longer-lived)
semantic subgraphs across classes. This is an interesting ob-
servation that warrants further investigation.
In conjunction with the difference in the induced number
of edges between adversarial and non-adversarial images, we
also observe that the average edge weights of the induced per-
sistent subgraphs differ between the two types of inputs. Fig-
ure 6 shows how the average edge weight amongst persistent
subgraphs induced by adversarial images is both lower and
less variable than those induced by non-adversarial images.
Again, this is an interesting observation that warrants further investigation.
Regardless of the origin of these differences between adversarial and non-adversarial induced
subgraphs, we can leverage these differences in order to detect adversarial inputs in our network.
We follow a similar construction as in Section 5.4.1 wherein we compute a statistic from Utrain
and use this statistic to detect adversaries.
For differences in edge count, we first note that the distribution on the number of edges of
the input-induced persistent subgraphs for both adversarial and non-adversarial inputs is highly
skewed (Figure 8). We define Etrain = {|Ex| | Ex ⊂ Gλx,x ∈ Utrain} as the edge counts of all
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Figure 7: Force-directed subgraphs from all components with lifetime > 0.1. Top: Unperturbed
MNIST images. Bottom: Adversarial images with target class same as the graph above.
persistent subgraphs induced by the training images. We then compute the median of this set of
edge counts mtrain = median(Etrain). We also compute the pith percentile of edge counts in Etrain.
We denote the value of this percentile ptrain.
Figure 8: Top: Distribution of
edge counts for non-adversarial
images. Bottom: Distribution of
edge counts for adversarial images.
We usemtrain and ptrain to detect adversarial inputs in the
neural network. For a given input x, if |Ex| > mtrain+ ptrain
where Ex ⊂ Gλx, we flag x as an adversarial input. The results
of this method are shown in Table 4.
For differences in average edge weight, recall the definition
of the persistent subgraph induced by an input x is Gλx =
(Vx, Ex, φ
′). We define the average edge weight of a persistent
subgraph induced by x in an expected manner as
ravg(G
λ
x) =
∑
e∈Ex⊂Gλx
φ′(e)
|Ex|
We then calculate the average edge weight and standard
deviation over the training examples as:
µφtrain =
∑
x∈Utrain
ravg(G
λ
x)
|Utrain|
σφtrain =
√√√√ ∑x∈Utrain(ravg(Gλx)− µφtrain)2
|Utrain| − 1
We use µφtrain and σ
φ
train to determine whether a given
input x is adversarial or not. Specifically, we flag an input x
as adversarial if ravg(Gλx) > µ
φ
train + σ
φ
train. The results of this approach are presented in Table 3.
6 Results
We test each of the adversary detection algorithms described in the previous section. For each
algorithm, we construct an image set of size 900 with 450 adversarial images (constructed as in
Section 4) and 450 unaltered images. We hold ρ = 0.99 and test the detection capabilities across
varying levels of hyperparameter λ with κ = 0. We also test the detection capabilities for the
highest and lowest values of λ with the adversarial set created by setting κ = 20. We compute
the accuracy and F1-score for each test. We also report the false-positive and false-negative rate.
Of special interest for our usage is the false-negative rate as this corresponds to the number of
adversarial images that are not detected by the algorithm.
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Table 1: Adversary detection results for maximum node matching. The top results for both κ
values are in bold.
κ λ Accuracy False Positives False Negatives F1-score
0 0.1 0.683 235 50 0.737
0 0.05 0.786 169 23 0.816
0 0.01 0.858 109 19 0.871
0 0.001 0.864 102 20 0.876
20 0.1 0.925 61 6 0.93
20 0.001 0.854 102 29 0.865
Table 2: Adversary detection results for average node matching. The top results for both κ values
are in bold.
κ λ Accuracy False Positives False Negatives F1-score
0 0.1 0.885 45 58 0.884
0 0.05 0.478 52 418 0.12
0 0.01 0.476 57 414 0.133
0 0.001 0.481 54 413 0.137
20 0.1 0.938 45 11 0.94
20 0.001 0.464 54 428 0.084
Overall, comparing the average edge count of adversarially-induced persistent subgraphs versus
the expected number of edges in the persistent subgraphs of non-adversarial inputs is the most
effective detection algorithm for low-confidence adversaries (κ = 0). This detection mechanism
is also the most effective for high-confidence adversaries (κ = 20). However, the maximum node
matching approach only misses 6 adversaries which is the next best performing algorithm for
κ = 20.
7 Discussion and Future Work
The results presented in this paper have shown numerous ways in which adversarial inputs may
be detected based on the topological signature induced in the neural network. However, there
are undoubtedly more and likely better ways to detect adversarial examples from their topological
signatures. For example, the authors have experimented with edge matching with construction
similar to the ranked node matching described in Section 5.4.1. However, the accuracy of this
approach was consistently lower than that of maximum and average node matching. Our similarity
measures are relatively simple, so future work may be in constructing more sophisticated similarity
measures that are more sensitive to adversarial inputs.
The primary downside of our topological adversary detection framework is in the computational
cost. For each input, we compute the persistent homology on graphs with tens to hundreds
of thousands, even with ρ = 0.99. As well, node matching is at least linear in the number of
nodes of the computed persistent subgraphs. If the number of classes increases, the computational
complexity of the maximum and average node matching algorithms increases as well. For a dataset
with thousands of classes, these methods may prove computationally intractable.
Despite the computational complexity, our topological approach is robust. As we have seen,
Table 3: Adversary detection results for average edge weighting. The top results for both κ values
are in bold.
κ λ Accuracy False Positives False Negatives F1-score
0 0.1 0.914 30 47 0.913
0 0.05 0.931 33 29 0.931
0 0.01 0.857 55 74 0.854
0 0.001 0.788 122 69 0.774
20 0.1 0.95 30 15 0.951
20 0.001 0.865 69 52 0.868
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Table 4: Adversary detection results for average edge counting. The top results for both κ values
are in bold.
κ λ pi Accuracy False Positives False Negatives F1-score
0 0.1 0.9 0.969 18 10 0.969
0 0.05 0.9 0.816 7 158 0.78
0 0.01 0.9 0.786 6 168 0.733
20 0.1 0.95 0.984 14 0 0.985
it is generally the case that these algorithms perform better with higher adversary distortion. As
well, the authors cannot envision a white-box attack that would be able to significantly alter the
performance of these algorithms given their deep integration with the features present in the input
space.
Extending these ideas to other datasets and other network architectures is a natural source of
future work. Due to the complexity constraints, the specific algorithms given above may not gener-
alize well to larger datasets like CIFAR. However, a topological approach to detecting adversarial
examples should still be fruitful. In fact, recent work [24] has shown that creating adversaries
in more complex datasets like CIFAR is significantly easier than creating MNIST adversaries. It
is reasonable to expect that, since the input CIFAR images are almost identical to their non-
adversarial counterparts, we may be able to view this lack of distortion topologically. As well,
many of the impediments to easily detecting adversarial MNIST images was in their homogeneity
across classes. For example, eights and zeros contain highly similar pixel distributions. In a dataset
with more heterogeneity across classes, the topological differences between classes may be more
apparent, making class changes easier to detect.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a method for topological analysis of neural network computations. By comput-
ing the persistent homology of the graph induced by input images, we constructed three robust
algorithms for detection of adversarial inputs based on the topological information contained in the
input-induced graph. Using images from MNIST, we show that our topological adversary detection
method is able to detect adversaries with upwards of 98% accuracy and F1-score 0.98.
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